Abstract. We prove (nearly) tight bounds on the concrete PRF-security of two constructions of message-authentication codes (MACs):
Introduction
Message-authentication codes. Message authentication codes (or MACs, for short) are central components of secure communication protocols like TLS. Secure MACs are required to be unpredictable, meaning that it is hard for an attacker to predict the MAC output (usually called the tag) under a secret key on a message, even given the tags of a number of (different) messages.
Practical MAC constructions have been based on block ciphers -like cipher block chaining (CBC) and its variants (first analyzed in [4] ) -and on hash functions -typically, using HMAC [3] . Security analyses often show that MAC constructions achieve a property even stronger than unpredictability, namely that of being a pseudorandom function (PRF) [22] , i.e., the outputs under a secret key are indistinguishable from random, except with a (small) distinguishing gap ε.
Contributions, in a nutshell. This paper studies the concrete PRF security of MAC constructions (i.e., how small can ε be?) by solving two technically connected open problems whose solutions require techniques that are substantially different from those in previous MAC analyses: First, we prove bounds for the concrete security of a variant of CBC-mode -truncated CBC -which remained unanalyzed to date. Second, we show improved bounds for the security of MAC constructions based on the sponge hash-function construction [11] which underlies the SHA-3 standard [1] .
Our bounds are tight for messages whose length does not exceed (roughly) mint2 r , 2 n{4 u blocks, where r is the output length of the constructions and n is the underlying block length -a constraint satisfied in most envisioned application scenarios. 3 The following paragraphs will elaborate on our contributions in detail.
CBC-MACs. The cipher block-chaining mode (or CBC, for short) is arguably the most natural block-cipher based MAC. It has been standardized already three decades ago [15, 28] , and its security was first analyzed by Bellare, Kilian, and Rogaway [4] . In its basic form, CBC is very simple: Given a block cipher E with n-bit block size, an input M P t0, 1u˚is padded into n-bit blocks M " M r1s . . . M r s, and then for a key K, CBC K pM q outputs the value Y resulting from the following iterative computation
where IV is an appropriate initialization value, e.g., IV " 0 n . Unfortunately, the basic CBC construction is only secure for messages of equal length , as proved in [4] . Otherwise, one can easily mount an extension attack, i.e., obtaining CBC K pM q " Y , and CBC K pY ' IV ' M 1 q " Y 1 (for n-bit values M , M 1 ) reveals us that CBC K pM } M 1 q " Y 1 without having to query M } M 1 . Three (variants of) solutions have been considered to prevent extension attacks: The first one is to consider prefix-free encoding of messages [36] . The second, known as encrypted CBC, outputs E K 1 pCBC K pM qq, under a key K 1 independent from K. (This has been used in EMAC, developed as part of the RACE project [39] ). Also, combinations of these ideas have been used in other constructions, like XCBC [12] , TMAC [27] , and OMAC [24] . The third solution, considered in this paper, is to use truncation, i.e., to only output the first r ă n bits of the output.
While the first two variants have been extensively analyzed [4, 36, 40, 29, 25, 5, 7, 37, 34, 32] , we are not aware of any formal analysis of truncated CBC having ever been published, let alone a tight one, even though truncation did appear in standards [15, 28] , mostly to increase flexibility.
Hash-function MACs. It appears simpler to derive hash-based MACs: It is not hard to prove that MAC K pM q " HpK } M q is a secure MAC (and PRF) for an ideal hash function H : t0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u n , i.e., which behaves as a random oracle [6] . Unfortunately, legacy hash functions like MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256 based on the Merkle-Damgård construction [17, 31] are far from ideal. In particular, they allow for extension attacks -given HpK } M q (and without knowing K and M ), one can compute HpK } M } M 1 q for any M 1 . HMAC [3] was the first hash-function based MAC construction preventing such extension attacks, and has been the object of several security analyses [2, 26, 18, 21] .
Sponges. In sharp contrast with legacy hash functions, the sponge construction [11] was designed with the goal of behaving as a random oracle (in the sense of indifferentiability [30] ). The construction relies on an invertible permutation π on n-bit strings. 4 For a parameter b ă n, it then pads the message M into b-bit blocks M r1s, . . . , M r s, and keeps a state S i } T i , where S i P t0, 1u b and T i P t0, 1u n´b , and outputs S r1..rs for some parameter 5 r ď b after the following iteration:
A variant of KECCAK [10] , using the sponge paradigm, was selected as the new hash function standard SHA-3 [1] by NIST.
In view of the lack of extension attacks, it is suggested (e.g. in [11] ) that sponge-based messageauthentication should simply occur by prepending the key to the message, with no need of using the HMAC construction. This mode was analyzed in [8] and a similar bound can also be inferred from the indifferentiability analysis of the sponge construction [11] . However, as we show below, these bounds are far from tight and are substantially improved by our work.
Our contributions, in detail. We present two technically related results:
Security of truncated CBC. We prove that no attacker makingueries of length at most ă 2 n{4 to TCBC using a random permutation can distinguish it from a random function, i.e., a function returning random outputs for each distinct message, except with distinguishing gap εpqq " Oˆ q 2 2 n`q pq` q 2 n´r˙.
This in turn implies security when the random permutation is replaced by a secure block cipher which is a good PRP. The first term matches the one from the best known analysis of prefix-free CBC [5] . Moreover, we show that the second term is tight for q ě , i.e., we exhibit a generic distinguishing attack with advantage Ωp q 2 2 n´r q. Security of sponge-based MAC. We prove that no attacker making q C queries of length at most ă 2 n{4 to the keyed Sponge construction using a random permutation π, and q π queries to π itself, can distinguish it from a random function, except with distinguishing gap roughly εpq C , q π q " Oˆ q C pq C`qπ q 2 n`q C pq C`qπ` q 2 n´r˙, for sufficient key length. This model -where π is ideal -is the traditional model for studying sponge-like constructions and their security against generic attacks. The previously best known bound for sponge-based authentication in this model [8] was dominated by a term of much larger magnitude Op 2 q 2 C {2 n´r q. We also show tightness of the second term for ă q π via an attack achieving distinguishing advantage Ω`q C¨qπ 2 n´r˘.
4 Naming consistency with the TCBC setting forces us to deviate from the usual naming in the literature on sponges, where our parameters n, b, r are usually denoted b, r, d; respectively. Hopefully this does not cause any confusion. 5 The sponge paradigm also allows for output of r ą b bits obtained by repeated application of π, an option that does not occur for any of the SHA-3 parameters, and that we will not consider for simplicity in the present paper.
We stress that the salient feature of these bounds is that the dependence on the length only affects terms with denominator 2 n , or appears in linear terms q{2 n´r (where here and below, for sponges q naturally represents q C ). This makes our bounds tight, as long as ď mint2 r , 2 n{4 u and q ě -which is a very common scenario. We leave the question of proving tightness of the remaining terms (or, alternatively, of improving our bounds) as an open problem which we believe to be quite challenging.
The truncated CBC result makes it evident that security requires either r fairly small (this is the case when using AES with n " 128), or a restriction on the maximum number of queries q, or the usage of a block cipher with larger block size n, such as Rijndael. 6 A small r is acceptable in settings where we use TCBC to obtain pseudorandom bits, or where it is used as a MAC, but only security against few (ă 2 r ) verification queries is needed. Either way, this is by far not an issue in the setting of sponges, where n is usually much larger than r. (For example, SHA-3-224 has r " 224, b " 1152 and n " 1600.) In fact, our results show that the parameters used in SHA-3 are more than generous for usage as a MAC, and setting e.g. r " 64 and n " 192 would already imply comfortable levels of security against generic attacks.
Another interesting consequence of our results is that with respect to pseudorandomness (and MAC) security, we are not constrained to any block length b ă n when evaluating the sponge construction -we could well XOR n-bit message blocks to the whole state. Indeed, our proof considers this generalized variant that pads the message into n-bit blocks that are XORed to the state during the absorption phase; this highlights the connection to the TCBC construction. Shorter block lengths can then be enforced by the padding function setting some of the bits to be 0 (e.g. the last n´b bits). Note that full, n-bit blocks were already used in the design of the sponge-based MAC construction donkeySponge [9] , and our result implicitly covers this construction as well.
Our techniques. The analysis of TCBC immediately appears harder than that of related constructions. Existing proofs are based on "Bad event analyses": For example, for encrypted MAC (as in EMAC), one defines the bad event that for two distinct query messages M, M 1 , CBC π pM q and CBC π pM 1 q collide, where CBC π denotes (plain) CBC-MAC using a random permutation π. It is not hard to prove that as long as no such collision occurs, the outputs π 1 pCBC π pMare indistinguishable from random for an independent permutation π 1 , and the distinguishing advantage is upper-bounded by the probability of such collisions. 7 This implies indistinguishability when π and π 1 are replaced by E K and E K 1 , respectively, for a block cipher E and independent keys K and K 1 . Similarly, for prefix-free CBC the bad event is that in the evaluation of CBC π pM q, the last internal query to π is not fresh, i.e., it was already made within the same or an earlier evaluation of CBC π .
For TCBC, however, if we make a query M , resulting into output Y (consisting of the first r bits of CBC π pM q), we cannot prevent the adversary from issuing a later query M 1 , with output Y 1 , where M 1 is a prefix of M . Previous machinery only tells us that CBC π pM q and CBC π pM 1 q are unlikely to collide, but this is insufficient to argue randomness and independence of Y and Y 1 . Moreover, the last query to π within the evaluation of CBC π pM 1 q cannot be fresh, as the same query was made earlier within the evaluation of CBC π pM q. One cannot swap the order of these queries either, as the choice of M 1 may well depend adaptively on Y .
To deal with this, our proof will crucially use Patarin's H-coefficient technique [35] : In this framework, one fixes a (deterministic) adversary A and a compatible transcript pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Y(i.e., A indeed would ask such queries M 1 , . . . , M q if fed with the corresponding answers Y 1 , . . . , Y q ) and then compares the probabilities that such a transcript would indeed occur with A in the real and in the ideal worlds, respectively. It is easy to see that the latter ideal-world probability is exactly 2´r q , as all outputs of a random functions on (distinct) inputs M 1 , . . . , M q are random.
However, the real world (where TCBC is evaluated), is far more complex. We are going to show the probability that Pr rTCBC π pM i q " Y i s is at least p1´εq2´r q , for some small ε, as long as π is uniformly distributed, conditioned on the following being true: -For every message M i , the value Z i Ð CBC π pM i q is unique. (This is equivalent to stating that the π-query leading to the value Z i in the evaluation of M i is unique.) Recall that the actual output on input M i consists of the first r bits of Z i . -For every message M i , and every message M j such that M i is a prefix of M j , the value Z i,j Ð CBC π pM i } mq is unique, where m is the first n-bit block in M j after the end of M i .
It turns out that those conditions are satisfied also except with some small probability δ. The actual indistinguishability bound happens to be ε`δ by the H-coefficient method, but determining both values will be at the core of the proof, and far from trivial. While an upper bound on δ follows by using techniques from [5, 37] , upper-bounding ε will require substantially new techniques. Our security proof for sponges is very similar, and will essentially rely on the argument that with good probability (roughly q π q{2 n ), queries to π made in the evaluation of the sponge queries and direct queries to π by the attacker are disjoint. However, while this is fairly simple to show when the sponge construction is keyed by setting the initial value pS 0 , T 0 q to be an n-bit secret key, proving the same statement when the key is input through several absorbing steps turns out to be significantly more involved. We also give a security proof for this more complex setting using techniques inspired by [14] . Although our analysis assumes that the (padded) keys and the actual message occupy separate blocks, our results can be extended to the completely general case at the cost of additional notational overhead.
Comparison with previous results on sponges. As already mentioned, the work [8] gives a bound for PRF-security of the sponge construction in the random permutation model. Their bound is dominated by a term which (with respect to our naming conventions) is roughly Op 2 q 2 {2 n´r q, significantly worse than the terms Opqpq` q{2 n´r q and Op q 2 {2 n q from our analysis.
A recent paper by Chang et al. [13] also provides a security analysis of variants of sponge constructions in the standard model. We note that (a simple twist of) their very elegant trick reduces the security of the sponge construction with a random IV as the key (this is the construction GSponge below) to the security of TCBC for a random permutation and the PRP security againstueries of a carefully crafted block cipher E π . The latter is built from the permutation π inside the sponge construction as E π K pXq " p0 b } Kq ' πpX ' p0 b } Kqq for X P t0, 1u n and K P t0, 1u n´b , where b is the block length. This construction is essentially a low-entropy single-key version of the Even-Mansour cipher [20, 19] , and one can apply the same analysis (with a lower-entropy key) in the setting where the attacker makes q π queries to π, this results in an additive term of Opπ {2 n´b q. In contrast, our analysis only incurs into an extra term of Opπ {2 n q.
More on truncation. There is a folklore belief that given a secure MAC, truncating its output may actually increase its security by hindering collision detection. This has never been verified formally, and providing an answer is an interesting open question. Nonetheless, our Ωpq 2 {2 n´r q lower bound does not contradict this belief, as we are applying truncation to a construction which (by itself, without truncation) is not a secure MAC, as our attacks query for non-prefix free messages.
Preliminaries
Basic notation. We denote rns :" t1, . . . , nu. Moreover, for a finite set S (e.g., S " t0, 1u), we let S n , S`and S˚be the sets of sequences of elements of S of length n, of arbitrary (but non-zero) length, and of arbitrary length, respectively (with ε denoting the empty sequence). We denote by Sris the i-th element of S P S n for all i P rns. Similarly, we denote by Sri . . . js, for every 1 ď i ď j ď n, the sub-sequence consisting of Sris, Sri`1s, . . . , Srjs, with the convention that Sri . . . is " Sris. Moreover, we denote by S } S 1 the concatenation of two sequences in S˚, and also, we let S T be the usual prefix-of relation: S T :ô pDS 1 P S˚: S } S 1 " T q.
We also let Fcspm, nq be the set of functions mapping m-bit strings to n-bit strings, and let Permpnq Ď Fcspn, nq be the set of permutations on the set of n-bit strings. We use the shorthand Fcsp˚, nq to denote the set of functions from t0, 1u˚to t0, 1u n . Finally, we denote the event that an adversary A, given access to an oracle O, outputs a value y, as A O ñ y.
Pseudorandom functions and permutations. We consider keyed functions F : t0, 1u κt 0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r taking a κ-bit key, arbitrary long messages M P t0, 1u˚as inputs, and returning an r-bit output. In particular, we denote as F K the map such that FpK,¨q " F K p¨q. We are going to consider the security of F as a pseudorandom function (or PRF, for short) [22] . This is defined via the following advantage measure, involving an adversary A, such that
Similarly, a block cipher is a keyed function E : t0, 1u κˆt 0, 1u n Ñ t0, 1u n such that E K P Permpnq, i.e., it is a permutation, for all κ-bit K. The traditional security of E is that of being a pseudorandom permutation (or PRP, for short), defined via the advantage measure
Informally, we say that F is a PRF, or E is a PRP, if the corresponding advantage is "negligible" for all "efficient" A's. We consider constructions Crπs : t0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r invoking a permutation π P Permpnq (we sometimes write C π instead of Crπs), and denote by C the resulting keyed function where the key is a permutation π P Permpnq (i.e., there are 2 n ! key values). Moreover, we can consider the natural instantiation of π via a block cipher E, and denote by CrEs the function which, for key K and input M , returns CrE K spM q. Then, the following relates the prf advantages for CrEs and for C. Proposition 1. For every adversary A with running time t and makingueries to its oracle, where each query results in at most invocations of the underlying π when input to Crπs, there exists an adversary B such that
where the adversary B makes q¨ queries, and runs in time t`Õpq¨ q.
In other words, if we assume that E is a good PRP (for example, E is AES), then we can focus on upper bounding the distinguishing advantage when C is instantiated with a randomly chosen permutation, which is a truly information-theoretic problem.
Pseudorandom functions in the ideal permutation model. For our analysis of sponges below, we are going to consider constructions F π which make queries to a randomly chosen permutation π $ Ð Permpnq which can be evaluated by the adversary in both directions. For this case, we use the following notation to express the PRF advantage of A: Fig. 1 . Truncated CBC. Representation of TCBC r,pad rπs. Here, M r1s, . . . , M r s are n-bit blocks resulting from applying the padding scheme pad to the input message M P t0, 1u˚.
MACs and Unpredictability. It is appropriate to note that our actual target is that of a message-authentication code (MAC). The requirement on a keyed function F : t0, 1u κˆt 0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r to be a secure MAC is that of unpredictability under a chosen-message attack, i.e., an attacker A, given adaptive access to F K p¨q, cannot output a valid pair pM, τ q such that F K pM q " τ and M was not queried to F K . We note that if Adv prf F pAq ď ε for any time t attacker A making q`q V queries, then no time t attacker makingueries to F K p¨q can output such a valid pair pM, τ q within q V attempts, except with probability at most ε`q V {2 r .
Truncated CBC and its Security
This first part of the paper deals with the concrete security of truncated CBC, which we first review.
Truncated CBC. We fix parameters r ă n and a padding scheme pad : t0, 1u˚Ñ pt0, 1u n q`, uniquely encoding arbitrary strings into non-empty sequences of n-bit blocks. We stress that we are not requiring the padding to be prefix-free. The canonical padding scheme computes padpM q by appending a single 1-bit to M , and then sufficiently many 0's to reach a length which is a multiple of n. In particular, a message M is encoded into " r |M |`1 n s n-bit blocks. We first introduce the CBC construction for padding scheme pad, based on π P Permpnq:
Then, for any π P Permpnq, truncated CBC (or TCBC, for short) behaves as follows (also cf. Figure 1 for a pictorial representation) on input M P t0, 1u˚, TCBC pad,r rπspM q " pCBC pad rπspMr1 . . . rs ,
i.e., it outputs the first r ă n bits of CBC pad rπspM q.
Security analysis. We prove the following theorem about the security of the TCBC construction in the case where π is randomly sampled from Permpnq. By Proposition 1, this in particular implies security when the permutation is instantiated with a block cipher which is a good PRP.
Theorem 1 (Security of TCBC). Let A be a prf-adversary making at mostueries, each of length at most ă 2 n{4 n-bit blocks (after padding). Let TCBC " TCBC r,pad rπs for a randomly sampled permutation π P Permpnq. Then, for any t ě 1,
The proof of Theorem 1 is found below in Section 4, where we also give high-level overviews of the individual components of the proof. Here, we first discuss the bound and its tightness.
Discussion of the bound. The above bound requires some discussion. First off, note that q ă 2 pn´rq{2 for the above bound to be negligible. We stress in particular that under the constraints ă 2 n{4 , the first three terms are the crucial ones, with the remaining terms being high order terms: Indeed, 2q{2 n is always negligible if the other terms are, and the second last term is for sure negligible as long as ă 2 n{4 . For the final term, note that q ă 2 3n{4 for the previous terms to be negligible, and the term becomes negligible for t ě 4.
We now show that this bound is essentially tight for the case where ă 2 r and q ě . Indeed, we show how to break TCBC with a q-query prf-adversary achieving distinguishing advantage roughly Ωpq 2 {2 n´r q. The attack works regardless of the permutation π used to instantiate TCBC.
Matching attack. For a parameter Q and t :" rn{rs, the attacker A Q,t proceeds as follows, given access to an oracle O, which we assume without loss of generality takes inputs M P pt0, 1u n q`. 8 Adversary A Q,t :
1. Query random M i P t0, 1u n for all i P rQs to O, obtaining output Y i P t0, 1u r . 2. For all i P rQs and j P rts,
If there exist distinct i, i 1 P rQs with Y i,j " Y i 1 ,j for all j P rts then output 1, else output 0.
Note that the attacker makes q " pt`1qQ queries. We are going to show that
independently of how the permutation π used by TCBC is instantiated.
Analysis.
We first analyze what happens in the real world when O " TCBC π for some permutation π P Permpnq. Let COLL be the event that for some M i and M i 1 , we have πpM i qrr`1 . . . ns " πpM i 1 qrr`1 . . . ns. Note that since the messages are chosen uniformly at random and independently, by the Birthday bound we have Pr rCOLLs " ΩpQ 2 {2 n´r q. Moreover, given COLL occurs due to message M i and M i 1 , then by construction Y i,j " Y i 1 ,j for all j P rts. Therefore,
However, if O " R for a truly random function R : t0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r then, unless there is a collision among the values M i (which occurs with probability OpQ 2 2´nq), all values Y i,j 's are independent random r-bit strings, and thus the probability that there are suitable i and i 1 is at most (again, by the Birthday bound) Q 2 2´r t ď Q 2 2´n. Altogether, this gives us Pr "
, for which the advantage bound follows.
Forging attack. Note that it is very easy to turn the above attack into a forging attack. Indeed, given access to TCBC π , once we have found appropriate collisions Y i,j " Y i 1 ,j for all j P rts, it is very easy to create a forgery, since M i } Y i } 0 n´r } 0 nt and M i 1 } Y i 1 } 0 n´r } 0 nt are also collidingwe can forge a tag of the latter by learning the tag of the former.
(Reduced) message tree. Example of message tree for permutation π P Permpnq and four messages M 1 " 0, M 2 " 0 } 0, M 3 " 0 } 1 } 1, and M 4 " 1, where b " b n for b P t0, 1u. The gray vertices correspond to these four messages. Labels are represented in proximity of the vertices and the edges they are assigned to (as a function of π) and we let λpεq " 0 " IV. The boxed labels are omitted in the reduced message tree.
first introduces the notational framework allowing us to precisely describe interactions between A and the given system -i.e., either TCBCrπs for a randomly chosen permutation π $ Ð Permpnq or a truly random function f $ Ð Fcsp˚, nq. Then, Section 4.2 will review the H-coefficient method, and how it will be applied to the concrete case of our proof. Finally, Section 4.3 will state the main concrete bounds we prove and how they are combined into our main theorem.
Simplifying assumption. Throughout the proof, we fix an adversary A. We assume that (1) A is deterministic, (2) it makes exactlyueries, and (3) it never repeats the same query twice. All these assumptions are without loss of generality for an information-theoretic indistinguishability analysis, since an arbitrary (possibly randomized) adversary making at mostueries can be transformed into one satisfying these constraints and achieving advantage which is at least as large.
Message trees and transcripts
We start by introducing some graph-theoretic concepts -the message tree, and its reduced version -which capture the inherent combinatorial structure of any q messages M 1 , . . . , Mueried by the attacker, as well as the internal values computed while these messages are processed by TCBC. Then, we will put these concepts to work to define transcripts describing the adversary's interaction with either of TCBC or a random function f .
We stress that our transcripts will release more information than what is actually seen by the adversary A in its interaction: This information will be useful for us to make the proof simpler, and it will not help substantially in distinguishing TCBC from random.
The message tree. Let q ě 1, π P Permpnq, and let M 1 , . . . , M q be arbitrary strings (which we refer to as the messages), where M i is padded into n-bit blocks by the pad function. In particular, we will identify M i with its padded version, i.e., assume that M i P pt0, 1u n q`, without loss of generality. These q messages induce a labeled tree T π pM 1 , . . . , M" pV, E, λ, γq -called the message tree, and often simply denoted as T or T π , whenever parameters are clear from the context -which we define as follows:
-The set V of vertices of the tree is V :" M 1 P pt0, 1u n q˚: Di P rqs : M 1 M i ( , where | is the prefix-of partial ordering of strings. In particular, note that the empty string ε is a vertex. -The set E Ď VˆV of (directed) edges is E :" tpM, M 1 q : Dm P t0, 1u n : M 1 " M } mu.
-We label vertices and edges recursively. Concretely, we define λ : V Ñ t0, 1u n and γ : E Ñ t0, 1u n . We start with λpεq " IV. Then, for every vertex M } m P V where M P V and m P t0, 1u n , we set λpM } mq " πpλpM q ' mq .
Moreover, we let γppM, M } mqq " λpM q ' m.
An example of a message tree is given in Figure 2 . Note that the vertex labels λpM q are exactly the values of CBCrπspM q while the edge labels correspond to the inputs on which π is invoked. We also remark that the labeling of the edges is redundant given the vertex labels as from the vertex-labels and V , it is possible to uniquely reconstruct the edge labels. However, defining the edge labels explicitly will be convenient for the proof. For convenience, we define for every vertex M P V (where possibly
This is because every edge pM i , M i } mq can be uniquely mapped to the shortest messages
The reduced message tree. We define an abridged version of the above tree, called the reduced message tree, which will be used in the definition of transcripts below, and which we denote by T π pM 1 , . . . , M. The intuition is that in an interaction with TCBCrπs, even given the reduced message tree, the outputs obtained by the adversary will look random and independent of the tree labels. This is far from simple to prove, and will be one of our main steps below.
To compute the reduced message tree, we first compute the whole message tree T π pM 1 , . . . , M" pV, E, λ, γq with resulting labels λ and γ, and we are going to check whether the following event has occurred (this will correspond to a degenerate labeling case that we will show to be quite unlikely):
-There exists i P rqs and M P V ztM i u such that λpM i q " λpM q; or -For some i P rqs and m P M i , there exists M P V ztM i } mu such that λpM i } mq " λpM q.
If so, then we let T " pV, E, K, Kq, i.e., we set the tree to have the empty labeling function. Note that this corresponds to the case where a label of an actual message in tM 1 , . . . , M q u, or of one of its sucessor vertices, collide with some other labels.
Otherwise, if the above event does not occur, we are going to selectively delete some labels from T (setting them to K) to obtain a new vertex-and edge-labeled tree, which is the value taken by T . Specifically, -For all i P rqs, we let λpM i q " K.
-For all i P rqs and all m P M i , we let γpM i , M i } mq " K.
In other words, we remove the information necessary to recover the values λpM i q for all i P rqs. 9 In general, we are allowing labels of vertices to possibly collide with each other. The first check however, potentially setting pλ, γq " pK, Kq, ensures that no "bad collisions" have occurred, i.e., no labels of actual messages (or their children vertices) collide with labels of other vertices, and this will be instrumental below.
Interactions and transcripts. We call a sequence of query/answer pairs pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Yvalid if the adversary A asks indeed queries M 1 , . . . , M q when fed with answers Y 1 , . . . , Y q to its queries. (Recall that the first query M 1 only depends on A, the second query only depends on A and the first answer Y 1 , etc..) In particular, a valid transcript has the form
where pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Yis A-valid, and π : t0, 1u n Ñ t0, 1u n is a permutation. We differentiate between the ways in which such valid transcripts are generated in the real and in the ideal worlds, respectively, by defining corresponding distributions T real and T ideal over the set of valid transcripts:
Real world. The transcript T real for the adversary A is obtained by sampling π $ Ð Permpnq, and letting
where we execute A, which asks queries M 1 , . . . , M q answered with Y i " TCBCrπspM i q for all i P rqs, and we let T π pM 1 , . . . , Mbe the corresponding reduced message tree. Note that because A is fixed, T real only depends on π, and thus we occasionally write T real pπq for the corresponding map. Ideal world. The transcript T ideal for the adversary A is obtained similarly to the above, but here we sample both a random permutation π and q independent random values Y 1 , . . . , Y q P t0, 1u r
where we execute A, which asks queries M 1 , . . . , M q answered with Y i for all i P rqs, and we let
We stress that here we are augmenting the ideal world with an additional random permutation π which does not actually exists in the original prf distinguishing game in order to make real-and ideal-world transcripts alike. Like the actual permutation π, the resulting (reduced) message tree is completely independent of the randomness Y 1 , . . . , Y q used to reply the adversary's queries.
Note that the range of T real is included in the range of T ideal by definition, and that the range of T ideal is easily seen to contain all valid transcripts.
The "H-Coefficient Method": Good and bad transcripts
We upper-bound the advantage A in distinguishing TCBCrπs for π $ Ð Permpnq from a random function in terms of the statistical distance of the transcripts, i.e.,
where the sum is over all valid transcripts. This is because a distinguisher for T real and T ideal , whose optimal advantage is exactly SDpT real , T ideal q, can always output the same decision bit as A, ignoring any extra information provided by the transcript.
To this end, we are going to use Patarin's H-coefficient method [35] . This just means that we need to partition the set of possible transcripts into good transcripts GT and bad transcripts BT to enable effective usage of the following lemma, whose proof is given for completeness in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 (The H-Coefficient Method [35]
). Let δ, ε P r0, 1s be such that:
More verbally, we want a set of good transcripts GT such that with very high probability (i.e., 1´δ) a generated transcript in the ideal world is going to be in this set, and moreover, for each such good transcript, the probabilities that it occurs in the real and in the ideal worlds are roughly the same, i.e., at most a multiplicative factor 1´ε apart.
pV, E, γ, λqq will be defined as "good" if the associated reduced message tree is not "too degenerate". This requires introducing two relevant quantities. To this end, we first note that T defines a partial permutation π: Concretely, we define π such that πpγpeqq " λpvq for every edge e with end-node v such that γpeq, λpvq ‰ K, and πpxq " K for all other inputs. We will make use of the following quantities, which connect the outputs Y 1 , . . . , Y q with T .
pV, E, γ, λqq be a valid transcript with associated partial permutation π. Then, we define:
i pτ q is the number of x P t0, 1u n with πpxq ‰ K and πpxqr1 . . . rs
Moreover, for a P t1, 2u, let N paq "
Let us give some intuition on the above quantities. Note that π is defined on at most q¨ values, and the values πpxq, when first defined, is obtained by sampling a (nearly) uniform random n-bit string. Thus the expectation of N p1q i is roughly q {2 r , and in turn, N p1q should be roughly q 2 {2 r . Also, note that N p2q i is the number of n-bit strings z which are consistent with Y i in their first r bits which have additionally the property that for some message block m P M i , z ' m is the (non-K) label of an edge in the reduced message tree. Here, the intuition is that every edge label γpeq in the partial tree is uniform (this won't be quite true, but let us assume it is), and therefore the expectation of N p2q i should be (roughly) D i q {2 r , and thus, the expectation of N p2q should also be roughly q 2 {2 r , using ř i D i ď q. Good transcripts. We are now ready to state the definition of a good transcript. Informally, what we require is that the actual values of N p1q and N p2q for the transcript τ are not too far off their (heuristic) expected values we mentioned above. Moreover, we also want that the reduced message tree is not degenerate, i.e., even though we can't see them, we want the guarantee that the labels of the actual messages (and their successors) are unique -the failure to satisfy this would be signalled by pλ, γq " pK, Kq by the definition of the reduced message tree.
Definition 2 (Good Transcripts
. . , M" pV, E, λ, γqq be a valid transcript. We say that the transcript is good (and thus τ P GT) if the following properties are true (for t ě 1 as in the theorem statement):
(1) pλ, γq ‰ pK, Kq.
We denote as GT the set of all good transcripts, and BT the set of all bad transcripts, i.e., transcripts which can possibly occur (i.e., they are in the range of T ideal ) and are not good. More specifically, we denote by BT i the set of all bad transcripts that do not satisfy the i-th property in the definition of a good transcript above, hence we have BT "
High-level lemmas and putting pieces together
Bounding the ratio. In Section 4.4 below, we are going to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For all good transcripts τ P GT,
Bounding probability of bad transcripts. We now upper-bound the probabilities that a transcript sampled according to T ideal is bad via the following lemmas. The first is proved in Appendix C, and the last two are proved in Appendix D.
Lemma 3 (Bad-Transcript Analysis for BT 1 ).
Lemma 4 (Bad-Transcript Analysis for BT 2 ). For all t ě 1,
Lemma 5 (Bad-Transcript Analysis for BT 3 ). For all t ě 1,
The proof of Lemma 3 above uses and extends techniques inherited from the work of [5] and in particular their analysis of prefix-free CBC. The proof requires some extra work, since we are considering non-prefix free messages. One would expect that the proofs of Lemma 4 and 5 follow by application of a simple Chernofflike argument. Unfortunately, more work is required: First off, the sampled values are not uniform, but only close to uniform. But more importantly, Lemma 5 requires to prove a concentration bound on a series of random variables (the edge labels) which are defined adaptively by an iterative process when computing the reduced message tree. Our technique will essentially show that most of the edge labels will exhibit a high degree of independence, and only a small number of them will be defined by "recycled values" when generating the tree.
Combining pieces. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 1 using ε and δ extracted from the above lemmas. In particular,
nq 2 2 n´r`8 q 2 4 2 2n , and
In particular, we simplify
Lower-bounding the probability ratio (Proof of Lemma 2)
Recall that we need to lower bound Pr rT real " τ s {Pr rT ideal " τ s for some τ " ppM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Y, T q P GT, which we fix from now on. To start with, we define the set Ωrτ s of π's consistent with τ in the real world, i.e.,
Ωrτ s " tπ P Permpnq : T real pπq " τ u .
Moreover, if τ " ppM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Y, T q, let Ω 1 rτ s be the set of permutations π which are consistent with the labels of the reduced message tree T (i.e., reducing T π pM 1 , . . . , Myields T ), however TCBC π pM i q does not need to equal Y i for all i. More formally,
and this will be a convenient quantity to work with. In particular, ppτ q is the probability that when sampling a random permutation π which is consistent with the constraints on the reduced message tree, we also have TCBC π pM i q " Y i for all i P rqs. 10 The following claim will reduce computing the probability ratio to computing ppτ q for τ P GT.
Claim. For all good transcripts τ P GT,
Proof (Of Claim). We first note that Pr rT ideal " τ s can be rewritten as the probability that a randomly sampled permutation π $ Ð Permpnq satisfies π P Ω 1 rτ s, and independently Y 1 , . . . , Y q are the selected outputs, i.e.,
and the claim follows by dividing both probabilities.
[ \ We are going to lower bound ppτ q ě p1´εq2´r q for ε as in the statement of the lemma, which clearly implies the lemma by the above claim. It is easy to see that the ordering of the messageoutput pairs pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Yis irrelevant, and we therefore assume without loss of generality that the ordering is prefix-preserving, i.e., if M i M j , then i ă j.
We consider an iterative process where we start with π defined by T as above, and then set the values of πpγpe i" λpM i q for i " 1, . . . , q one after the other in this order. Moreover, when setting λpM i q " πpγpe iÐ Z i , for all m P M i , we do the following:
Note that sampling such a π is not the same as sampling a random π which is consistent with π. The latter may allow for some permutations which are not possibly generating a message tree which can be reduced to T .
-If we know the value λpM i } mq, we set πpZ i ' mq Ð λpM i } mq. 11
Note that depending on the choice of the Z i 's, the resulting π may or may not be a partial permutation, or we may overwrite values, etc. We will of course be only interested in sequences of Z i 's which maintain the permutation property. In particular, we consider the random experiment where we sample π $ Ð Ω 1 rτ s (which is in particular consistent with the initial π), and then set Z i Ð πpγpe i qq. Then,
. . , pM q , Ybe the set of possible sequences pz 1 , . . . , zof distinct q values such that z i r1 . . . rs " Y i for all i P rqs and when assigning λpM i q Ð z i for all i P rqs in the above process, at the end of the process the labels λpM i q " z i are unique (i.e., no other vertex has the same label) and moreover, for all i P rqs and all m P M i , we also have that λpM i } mq is a unique label. (Note that since the transcript is good, and pλ, γq ‰ pK, Kq, these are exactly the sequences which are possible, even though an exact match is really not necessary for a lower bound.) Below we are going to show that |L| is sufficiently large, and hence not empty. For now, we observe the following claim, which will allow us to lower bound ppτ q via |L|.
Proof (Of Claim). Fix pz 1 , . . . , zP L, and define x i :" γpe i q for all i P rqs as the label γpe i q we encounter if we were to answer with the sequence pz 1 , . . . , zin the iterative process. Then
We let E 1 Ď E be the set of edges pM, M } mq such that at the beginning of the process, λpM q or λpM } mq (or possibly both) are not defined, and let D :" EzE 1 . Clearly we have te 1 , . . . , e q u Ď E 1 and |D|`|E 1 | " |E|.
Note that because τ P GT and the definition of L, at the end of the process πpxq is defined for exactly |D|`|E 1 | " |E| values. This is because τ is good, and in particular this means that all values πpxq we set are for distinct x (this follows from the fact that pλ, γq ‰ K), and there is one such value being set for every edge in E 1 (during the process) and for every edge in D (from the beginning). Hence there are exactly p2 n´| D|´|E 1 |q! ways to complete π into a permutation π P Ω 1 rτ s. Thus, this is exactly the number of permutations in Ω 1 rτ s with πpx i q " z i for all i P rqs.
On the other hand, the claim follows from the fact, which we show next, that the number of permutations in Ω 1 rτ s satisfiesˇˇΩ
This can be seen by encoding π P Ω 1 rτ s as follows (given τ , and in particular the initial value of π): We start with an empty list H of n-bit strings. We run the above process using π, and every time we set a value λpM i q " πpγpe i" z i , we append z i to H. Note that since τ is good (and thus the initial pλ, γq are not pK, Kq), the γpe i q's are all distinct. Also, all derived values we set (again because τ is good) will be on different input. Therefore, the q values z 1 , . . . , z q define the behavior of π on |E 1 | values, while it was defined on |D| values already at the beginning of the process. Hence, the encoding is completed by adding to H all πpxq (wrt the lexicographic ordering of the inputs x) for all x such that no edge in the graph is labeled with x at the end of the iterative process. It is not hard to see that this encoding is unique, and that there are at most 2 nq p2 n´| D|´|E 1 |q! such sequences H.
[ \ To conclude, it is easy to verify that
The lower bound on |L|. Here, to lower bound |L|, we go through the above process, and assuming z 1 , . . . , z i´1 have been fixed, we see how many ways we still have to fix z i satisfying the invariant that it is still possible to reach sequence pz 1 , . . . , zP L. In particular, at every step, we are going to exclude values z i with the following properties:
There exists a n-bit value m P M i and an edge e P E with tail node not in
It is clear that we reach a sequence in L if we satisfy this invariant. In particular, note that (4) and (5) are necessary for us to ensure that the edge labels leading to successor vertices of M i are fresh, which is necessary to ensure that the sequence is in L. Now, for every i, note that due to condition (1) there are initially 2 n´r possible values for z i , i.e., all strings with the first r bits equal to Y i . However, we need to remove all strings satisfying any of (2)-(5) above. These can be counted as follows:
(2) There are at most i ď q such values. 
where we used the fact that ś i p1´x i q ě 1´ř i x i , and that
Sponge r,pad rπspM q Fig. 3 . Sponge construction. Representation of Sponge r,pad b rπs used with a padding scheme pad b that enforces b-bit blocks.
Security Analysis of Sponge-Based MACs
Sponge-Based MAC. We first briefly review the usage of the sponge hash-function [11] as a MAC via key-prepending. As in the TCBC case above, we fix parameters n, r and a padding scheme pad : t0, 1u˚Ñ pt0, 1u n q`, uniquely encoding arbitrary strings into non-empty sequences of n-bit blocks, not necessarily in a prefix-free fashion. Then, the construction Sponge " Sponge r,pad rπs : t0, 1u κˆt 0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r operates as follows on input M P t0, 1u˚and key K P t0, 1u κ , for a permutation π P Permpnq:
Construction Sponge r,pad rπs K pM q:
(1) Compute padpK } M q " Kr1s . . . Krws M r1s . . . M r s (for some and w).
(2) Then, starting with V 0 :" 0 n , compute V i " πpKris ' V i´1 q for all i P rws and let
Next, starting with S 0 :" K 1 , compute S i " πpM ris ' S i´1 q for all i P r s. (4) Finally, output S r1 . . . rs, i.e., the first r bits of S .
Note that we are silently assuming (for simplicity) that the (padded) keys and the actual message end up in different blocks, and hence our naming conventions. Our results can be extended to the more general case, but we avoid the notational overhead in this version of the paper.
Different from the actual hash-function instantiations, the presented Sponge construction is more general in that it allows for processing n-bit input blocks in the absorption phase. We can retrieve the originals sponge construction and SHA-3 instantiations as special case -shorter blocks can be enforced by the padding function pad, which we only require to be injective, but an added benefit of our analysis is that it shows that such shorter blocks are not necessary. The construction Sponge r,pad rπs using a customary padding pad b that enforces b-bit blocks is depicted in Figure 3 .
Finally, we also consider a variant of the construction -called GSponge -that takes an n-bit key K and differs from Sponge in step (2) where it directly sets K 1 :" K instead of absorbing the key. The construction is similar to some other MAC designs such as donkeySponge [9] and Pelican [16] . This natural variant will be simpler to analyze -and will be indeed analyzed first. The bound for the Sponge construction will be derived from the one for GSponge via a high-level lemma of independent interest proving the soundness of the key extraction method.
Security analysis of GSponge. We prove the following theorem about the GSponge construction.
Theorem 2 (Security of GSponge). Let A be a PRF-adversary in the ideal permutation model, making at most q π queries to π and at most q C queries of length at most ă 2 n{4 blocks to the construction (either GSponge r,pad rπs for a random n-bit key K or a random function). Then, for all t ě 1,
We note that is in the case of TCBC, for sufficiently large t and for ă 2 n{4 , the first two terms are the leading terms. We will prove below tightness of the bound when ă 2 r and q π ě . The proof is an adaptation of the proof strategy of Theorem 1 to the setting of sponges. Hence, we start by observing that the current setting with GSponge is very similar to the setting considered in Theorem 1 involving the TCBC construction, with two important differences:
-The processing of a message in GSponge starts from the key K, as opposed to using a fixed initialization vector IV in TCBC. -We now allow the adversary to also query the random permutation π that was secret before.
We will indeed show that as we start with a random IV, the probability that internal queries and direct queries to π will not intersect, except with probability Op ¨q C q π {2 n q
In Appendix F we describe the modifications that have to be applied to the proof of Theorem 1 in order to account for these differences.
Tightness. One can trivially adapt the attack given in Section 3 to the setting of sponges, obtaining a prf-adversary that asks q C construction queries and no π-queries, and achieves advantage at least Ωpq 2 C {2 n´r q. Here we present a different generic attack on sponges that needs q C construction queries and q π queries to π, and achieves advantage roughly Ωpq C q π {2 n´r q.
For simplicity, we again assume that the attacker can query the construction with unpadded messages. For parameters Q 1 , Q 2 and t :" rn{rs, the attacker A Q 1 ,Q 2 ,t proceeds as follows, given access to the construction oracle O (which is either GSpongerπs under a random key K or a random function) and the permutation oracle πp¨q.
1. For all i P rQ 1 s query distinct random one-block messages M i P t0, 1u n to O, obtaining output Y i P t0, 1u r . 2. For all i P rQ 1 s and j P rts query M i } Y i } 0 n´r } 0 npj´1q to O, obtaining output Y i,j P t0, 1u r . 3. For all i P rQ 2 s, choose distinct random B i,0 P 0 r } t0, 1u n´r and for each j P rts query πp¨q to compute B i,j " πpB i,j´1 q. 4. If there exist i P rQ 1 s, i 1 P rQ 2 s with Y i,j " B i 1 ,j r1..rs for all j P rts then output 1, else output 0.
The attacker A Q 1 ,Q 2 ,t makes q C " pt`1qQ 1 construction queries and q π " tQ 2 queries to π. As we sketch in Appendix E, it achieves the advantage Ω`r 2 q C q π {n 2 2 n´r˘. Just as in the case of TCBC in Section 3, the attack above can trivially be turned into a forging attack. The same attack also works for the construction Sponge.
From GSponge to Sponge: Replacing the Uniform Key. Our final result proves the security of the Sponge construction when using the customary padding pad b , where the pκ " w¨bq-bit key K is first split into w b-bit blocks as Kr1s¨¨¨Krws, each of them is padded with n´b trailing zeroes and absorbed by the construction, as depicted in Figure 3 . The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix G, and relies on a detailed analysis of the key absorption mechanism which shows that the behaviors of GSponge and Sponge are indistinguishable given enough key material.
Theorem 3 (Security of Sponge). Let A be a PRF-adversary in the ideal permutation model, making at most q π queries to π and at most q C queries of length at most ă 2 n{4 blocks to the construction (either Sponge r,pad b rπs with the padding pad b and a random pw¨bq-bit key, or a random function). Then, for all t ě 1, and q " q π` q C ă 2 n´b , we have
Adv
where A t denotes the expression on the right-hand side of inequality (9) . If w " 1, one can replace the whole min-term by q 2 bw .
We remark that our proof is highly non-trivial for the case where q 2 ą 2 n´b , where q " q π`qC¨ is the overall number of queries to π in the experiment, and requires an adaptation of combinatorial techniques inspired by [14] to a slightly more general setting. Roughly, the extra term is obtained by upper bounding the probability that all queries necessary for absorbing the actual sampled key are contained among the q permutation queries made by the attacker or by the sponge construction (after key absorption). We note that the additional terms are smaller than Apq c , q π q when the key length is bw « 2n and q ą 2 pn´bq{2 or bw « n and q ă 2 pn´bq{2 . (Note that the latter case is in the same query regime as the indifferentiability proof [11] .) Also, in SHA-3, where e.g. we could have b " 1152, the case w " 1 is largely sufficient, as security would hold as long as q ă 2 b . 
A The H-Coefficient Method
In this section we prove the basic lemma underlying Patarin's H-Coefficient method [35] .
Lemma 1 (restated). Let δ, ε P r0, 1s be such that:
Then, Adv
prf TCBC pAq ď SDpT real , T ideal q ď ε`δ . Proof. Let T be the set of valid transcripts such that Pr rT ideal " τ s ě Pr rT real " τ s. Then,
pPr rT ideal " τ s´Pr rT real " τ sq by the fundamental properties of the statistical distance. Then, note that T can be partitioned into two blocks T X BT and T X GT. On the one hand, we can use (a) to upper bound
On the other hand, (b) implies ÿ τ PT XGT pPr rT ideal " τ s´Pr rT real " τ sq ď ε¨ÿ τ PT XGT Pr rT ideal " τ s ď ε .
Therefore, SDpT real , T ideal q ď ε`δ. Moreover, every adversary A can be turned into a distinguisher A 1 for T real and T ideal , which looks at the first part of the transcript (i.e., the one containing the q message-output pairs pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Y), and outputs the corresponding decision bit A would output (this bit is uniquely defined by the fact that A is deterministic). Then, we clearly have
as the statistical distance is the quantity corresponding to the advantage of the best A'.
[ \
B Chernoff bounds
Below, we are going to use the following standard variant of the Chernoff bound. See e.g.
[33] for a proof.
Theorem 4 (Chernoff bound). Let X 1 , . . . , X T be independent random variables with ErX i s " p i and X i P r0, 1s. Let X " ř T i"1 X i and µ "
-Pr rX ě p1`δqµs ď e´δ 2 2`δ µ .
-Pr rX ď p1´δqµs ď e´δ 2 2`δ µ .
C Bad-Transcript Analysis: The Collision Events
To bound the probability of the ideal transcript being bad, in this section we start by bounding Pr rT ideal P BT 1 s. We take a combinatorial approach inspired by [5, 21] and represent the computation of TCBC on various inputs by directed graphs; the following useful notation closely follows [5] .
Graph-Based Representation of TCBC. Let M " pM 1 , M 2 q be two distinct messages that can be parsed into n-bit blocks as . For any fixed permutation π P Permpnq and a pair of such messages M we define the structure graph 12 G M π , which is a directed graph pV, Eq where V Ď t0, . . . , Λu together with a edge-labeling function L : E Ñ tM p1q , . . . , M pΛq u. The structure graph G M π " G " pV, E, Lq is defined as follows: We set C 0 " 0 n and for i " 1, . . . , Λ we define
From these values C i we define the mapping r.s G : t0, . . . , Λu Ñ t0, . . . , Λu as ris G " mintj : C j " C i u. It is convenient to also define a mapping r.s 1 G as ris 1 G " 0 if i " 1 and ris 1 G " ris G otherwise. Now the structure graph G M π " G " pV, E, Lq is given by
Let GpMq " tG M π : π P Permpnqu denote the set of all structure graphs associated to the message pair M. Note that sampling the permutation π uniformly at random also induces a probability distribution on the set GpMq. For G " pV, E, Lq P GpMq we denote with G i " pV i , E i , L i q the subgraph of G given by the i first edges, i.e., we let V i " tv P V : v ď iu, E i " tpu, vq P E : u, v P V i u and L i is L with the domain restricted to E i . We will refer to G P GpMq as consisting of two paths, the "M 1 -path" which passes through the vertices 0, r1s G , . . . , r 1 s G and the "M 2 -path" 0, r 1`1 s G , . . . , r 1` 2 s G . We denote by V i j pGq the i-th vertex on the M j -path, hence for 1 ď i ď 1 we have V i 1 pGq " ris G , while for 1 ď i ď 2 we get V i 2 pGq " ri` 1 s G ; and V 0 1 pGq " V 0 2 pGq " 0. Collisions. Suppose a structure graph G " G M π P GpMq is exposed edge by edge (i.e. in step i the value ris G is shown to us). We say that G has a collision is step i if the edge exposed in step i points to a vertex which is already in the graph. With ColpGq we denote all collisions, i.e. all pairs pi, jq where in step i there was a collision which hit the vertex computed in step j ă i:
ColpGq " tpi, ris G q : ris G ‰ iu . 12 Note that the structure graph differs from the message tree considered before.
Induced Collisions and Accidents. We distinguish two types of collisions, induced collisions and accidents. Informally, an induced collision in step i is a collision which is implied by the collisions in the first i´1 steps, whereas an accident is a "surprising" collision.
Assume that after step i´1 we see that for some a ă i the a-th edge pra´1s 1 G , ras G q has the same label (M paq " M piq ) and the same starting point (pra´1s 1 G " ri´1s 1 G ) as the next (i-th) edge to be exposed. Then we know that the endpoint of the i-th edge must also be ras G as ra´1s G " ri´1s G means C ra´1s G " C ri´1s G , and as π must produce the same output on the same input, we also get C ras G " πpC ra´1s 1 G ' M pa" πpC ri´1s 1 G ' M pi" C ris G . More generally, it was shown in [5] that G has an induced collision is step i if the edge added in step i (or, that would be added if it was not already there) closes a cycle with alternating edge directions, moreover then the XOR of all labels of all the edges of that cycle is 0 n . (Note that the case of two parallel edges considered before form exactly such a cycle of length two and also 0 n " M piq ' M paq as we saw that M piq " M paq .)
Formally, we define a function AltCyc which takes as input a partial structure graph G i " pV i , E i , L i q, a vertex v and a label X as follows
. . , e 2k u P E i where e i " pv i , v i`1 q for odd, and e i " pv i , v i`1 q for even i, and
Now the induced collisions are the collisions pi, jq where the i-th edge pri´1s 1 G , jq can (and thus must) be added to G i´1 such that we close a cycle with alternating edge directions where the labels on the cycle XOR to 0 n , i.e., IndColpGq " tpi, jq : 1 ď i ď m, j " AltCycpG i´1 , ri´1s 1 G , M piand j ‰ Ku , and accidents are all the non-induced collisions: AccpGq :" ColpGqzIndColpGq. Let G a pMq " tG : G P GpMq, |AccpGq| " aq denote all structure graphs with exactly a accidents. For any predicate P on structure graphs, let φ M rP s denote the set of all structure graphs G having exactly one accident and satisfying the predicate P , i.e.,
As an example, consider the predicate P defined as V
p¨q, in that case we obtain φ M rV
.
Finally, following [5] , for two messages M 1 , M 2 P Bǹ we let FCP n pM 1 , M 2 q (the full collision probability) be the probability, over π Ð Permpnq, that
Note that if M 2 ffl M 1 then our definition matches the definition of full collision probability in [5] .
On the other hand, if M 2 M 1 the original definition becomes void (the probability is equal to 1), while our variant will prove to be useful also in this case. We will make use of the following results proven in [5] .
Proposition 2. Let M " pM 1 , M 2 q be a pair of messages such that M i P B i n and i ď for both i P t1, 2u. We can now proceed to upper-bounding the probability PrrT ideal P BT 1 s.
Lemma 3 (restated).
PrrT ideal P BT 1 s ď 16 q 2 {2 n`1 28 4 q 2 {2 2n .
Proof. We will denote by MsgQpτ q " tM 1 , . . . , M q u the set of all message queries present in the transcript τ . By definition of BT 1 , we have T ideal P BT 1 if T " pV, E, K, Kq and this occurs only if at least one of the following two events happens in the ideal experiment (in their description, λ refers to the non-restricted labelling):
(1) There exists i P rqs and M P V ztM i u such that λpM i q " λpM q.
(2) There exists i P rqs, m P M i , and M P V ztM i } mu such that λpM i } mq " λpM q.
Let us denote these two events as B 1 and B 2 respectively, and let us first consider B 1 . Since every vertex in T π pM 1 , . . . , Mlies on some path from the root to some leaf (and all leaves belong to MsgQpτ q), by union bound we have
summing over all M i P MsgQpτ q, and all M j P MsgQpτ q that correspond to leaves in T π pM 1 , . . . , M. The probability is taken over the choice of a uniformly random permutation π. If the message pair tM j , M i u is prefix-free (i.e., M i ffl M j and M j ffl M i ), then we can apply statement (i) in Proposition 2 to conclude that FCP n pM j , M i q ď 8 {2 n`6 4 4 {2 2n . Since M j is a leaf in T π pM 1 , . . . , M, clearly it cannot be a nontrivial prefix of M i and hence the last case that needs to be considered is if M i M j . In this case the structure graph for tM j , M i u consists of the M j -path and M i does not introduce any additional vertices. Let us denote by j and i the lengths of M j and M i , respectively; and let V i 1 and V i 2 denote the i-th vertex on the M j -path and M i -path, respectively (starting from 0). Then we have V 1 " V i 1 for some i ‰ i can only occur if at least one accident happens. We know from Proposition 2 (iii) that two or more accidents can only occur with probability at most 64 4 {2 2n . For the case of exactly one accident, Proposition 2 (iv) shows that there are at most structure graphs satisfying V i 1 " V i 1 for some i ‰ i , and by Proposition 2 (ii) each of these graphs can occur with probability at most 2{2 n as long as ď 2 n´2 .
Putting it all together, the values FCP n pM j , M i q in (10) are upper-bounded by 8 {2 n`6 4 4 {2 2n for all pairs pM j , M i q such that M i ffl M j , and by 2 {2 n`6 4 4 {2 2n for all pairs pM j , M i q such that M i M j . We are summing over at most q 2 pairs pM j , M i q in total, hence from (10) we obtain PrrB 1 s ď 8 q 2 {2 n`6 4 4 q 2 {2 2n .
While for upper-bounding PrrB 1 s we considered the probability that one of the vertices M i will obtain the same label as some other vertex in the message tree, for PrrB 2 s we need to consider the same probability for child vertices M i } m for some m P M i . However, note that in the analysis above, we did not use any property of the inspected vertices M i beyond the fact that there are q of them. Since by (3) there are at most q child vertices M i } m for some i P rqs and m P M i , we can apply the same analysis as above to conclude that also PrrB 2 s ď 8 q 2 {2 n`6 4 4 q 2 {2 2n .
[ \ D Bad-Transcript Analysis: The N piq quantities
We now turn to upper-bounding the probabilities Pr rT ideal P BT i s for i P t2, 3u, i.e., proving Lemmas 4 and 5. While the proofs may appear at first to be a simple application of usual conventional Chernoff-like concentration techniques, they will require extra care due to the process of defining the trees. In particular, we will have to tackle two main challenges:
-The vertex labels are outputs of a permutation, and not of a function.
-Multiple vertices M and M 1 can be assigned the same label λpM q and λpM 1 q, however, whether this is the case depends on the value of labels assigned earlier in the process of computing the labels of the reduced message tree T π .
An alternative sampling process. As the common denominator between the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5, it will be convenient to think of an alternative process to compute the transcript (and in particular T π pM 1 , . . . , M, and its reduced version), parameterized by the value t ě 1 from the theorem statement. This will allow us to use conventional Chernoff bounds for independent random variables at the cost of considering t times more samples.
Process SimulateIdealTranscriptpA, tq:
1. We first sample independent r-bit strings Y 1 , . . . , Y q 2. The attacker A gives queries M i , which are replied with Y i , for all i P rqs.
3. Then, we compute the message tree T " pV, E, λ, γq by defining V and E with respect to M 1 , . . . , M q , and setting the labels λ, γ as follows. We initially set λpεq Ð IV, and set the labels γpeq of the edges leaving the root.
Then, for every vertex M ‰ ε (traversed in some prefix-preserving order, i.e., if M 1 M 2 , then we visit M 1 before M 2 ) with parent vertex M 1 and e :" pM 1 , M q, sample t independent uniform n-bit strings U M,1 , . . . , U M,t , and proceed as follows.
-If πpγpeqq ‰ K, we set λpM q Ð πpeq.
-Otherwise, we set λpM q " πpγpeqq Ð U M,j for the smallest j such that U M,j was not used earlier as a vertex label yet. If all values have been used, then we set a bad flag to 1, and set πpγpeqq " λpM q Ð U M,t . -Also, for all m P M M , set the edge labels γppM, M } mqq Ð λpM q ' m.
The resulting transcript T 1 ideal rts is defined as ppM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Y, T q, where T is the reduced version of the message tree T " pV, E, λ, γq defined by the above process. Moreover, let p T 1 ideal rts be the same as T 1 ideal rts, except that the tree is not reduced.
Let p T ideal denote the ideal transcript with the non-reduced version of the message tree. The following lemma shows that for sufficiently large parameter t ě 1, p T ideal and p T 1 ideal rts are very close in statistical distance.
Lemma 6. For all t ě 1,
Proof. Let p be the probability that bad is set to 1 at some point during the generation of p T 1 ideal rts. Then, by a standard argument SDp p T ideal , p T 1 ideal rtsq ď p, since as long as bad is not set to 1, the process simulates the exact distribution as if we were using a random permutation. In every step i where we set the output value of π, we can easily show (as the values U M,1 , . . . , U M,t are independent) that Pr rbad is set in Step is ď´q 2 n¯t , as π has been defined for at most i ď q input values so far. A bound on p follows by the union bound.
[ \ Proof of Lemma 4. Fix Y 1 , . . . , Y q . We are going to upper-bound the probability that N p1q ą B, where
Define r N p1q "
are defined with respect to a transcript sampled from the alternative transcript distribution T 1 ideal rts. Then, by Lemma 6,
For all i P rqs, defineN i to be the number of U M,j 's sampled in the process of generating T 1 ideal rts such that U M,j r1 . . . , rs " Y i . (Independently of whether these values come to use or not.) Note that we sample T :" p|V |´1q¨t ď pq qt independent n-bit values in the process (i.e., t values for every non-root vertex), and that clearly r N p1q i ďN i . We expect T {2 r of these values to equal Y i . Consider now the following two cases:
Case 1: T {2 r ě n. Here, by applying the Chernoff bound (Theorem 4)
Case 2: T {2 r ă n. Here, again by the Chernoff bound,
We can wrap up using the union bound: The probability that there exists some i P rqs such that N i ą 3T {2 r`2 n is at most q¨e´n. Therefore, except with probability q¨e´n, r N ď N ď 3qT {2 r`2 qn ď 3tq 2 {2 r`2 qn, as we wanted to show.
Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that we are interested in studying the quantity
for a given transcript τ sampled according to T ideal . In particular, we assume now that the first part of the transcript pM 1 , Y 1 q, . . . , pM q , Yhas been fixed arbitrarily, and we are computing the tree T π pM 1 , . . . , M, for an independent permutation π $ Ð Permpnq. For every edge e P E and every i P rqs, define r N e,i to be the number of m P M i such that pγpeq ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i , and we also let
where we have used the conventions r N e :" We first observe that N p2q i ď r N i , and thus N p2q ď r N . This is because for every z P t0, 1u n such that zr1 . . . rs " Y i and there exists m P M i and e P E such that γpeq " z ' m, we have γpeq ' m " z and thus pγpeq ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i , or in other words, r N e,i,m " 1. Moreover, we are also possibly overcounting, since the new random variables are defined with respect to the whole tree T π , and not just its reduced version.
The splitting trick. In the following, we are going to show that r N (and hence N p2q ) cannot be too large. To this end, we will split every random variable r where r N J e,i is defined as r N e,i above, but only if the tail of the edge e was assigned as a label a fresh permutation value, and is 0 otherwise. 13 Conversely, r N K e,i,m is defined as r N e,i above, but only if the tail node of e was re-assigned a previously used permutation value, or if the tail node is the root. For b P tJ, Ku, we define analogously r N n e,i , r N b , r N b e and r N b i by only taking partial sums over the corresponding r N b e,i,m 's. In the following, we are going to show, via two different analyses, that r N J and r N K are not too large, except with small probability. The two analyses use very different techniques.
Lemma 7. For all t ě 1, we have
Lemma 8. We have,
Therefore, we conclude the proof of Lemma 5 by adding the two bounds.
Analysis of r N J (Proof of Lemma 7). Let V 1 Ă V be the set of non-root inner vertices of T , and let E 1 be the set of edges with their tail node in V 1 . (These are all edges, except those leaving the root.) Now, we consider the random experiment defining T 1 ideal rts. There, for every j P rts and e " pM 1 , M 1 } m 1 q, we are going to define similar random variables p N J e,i,j,m as r N J e,i,m , except that p N J e,i,j,m is simply one whenever the j-th value U M 1 ,j (out of t of them) generated when visiting M 1 is such that pU M 1 ,j ' m 1 ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i , regardless of whether λpM 1 q is assigned U M 1 ,j or not. Then, we let
Then, by Lemma 6, for B J :" 3t¨q 2 {2 r`2 nq 2 ,
In particular, this is true if we only consider r N J in the experiment where T 1 ideal rts is sampled, and the inequality holds, because p N J can not be smaller then r N J .
For every M 1 P V 1 , i P rqs, j P rts, and m P M i , we now introduce the shorthand
i.e., the number of edges e outgoing from M 1 for which pU M 1 ,j ' m 1 ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i for the j-th value U M 1 ,j generated when visiting M 1 . Then,
In particular, p N J i,m is the sum of T :" t¨|V 1 | independent random variables, where we note that
Thus, by linearity, its expected value is µ m,i " Er p N J i,m s " t¨|E 1 |{2 r ď tq {2 r . To apply the Chernoff bound, it is worth it to scale the random variables p N J i,m , dividing them by D to make them into r0, 1s-values, where
To conclude, we are going to show that this probability is smaller than e´n ď 2´n. Therefore, by the union bound, it follows that the probability that Pr
ı is bounded by q¨2´n, as there are at most q pairs i P rqs, m P M i . Together with (13) , this implies Lemma 7.
where, using D ď q and µ i,m ď q¨n,
Case 2. µ i,m ą q¨n. Here, we compute
where, using again D ď q,
Analysis of r N K (Proof of Lemma 8). First, let E 1 Ď E be the set of edges which are not outgoing from the root. Then, we are going to split r
as there are at most q edges in EzE 1 . We are going to bound the sum by using Markov inequality. Therefore, we start by computing the expectation µ :" ř
ı .
Assume now without loss of generality that T π and its labels are defined iteratively by traversing it in some order preserving the prefix-of order. We focus now on computing, for a particular e and i, the value Er r N K e,i s. To this end, define r N K M 1 ,e,m,i for every M 1 ď e (which means that M 1 was traversed before reaching edge e) and every m P M i : It equals one if pγpeq ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i , λpM q " λpM 1 q, where M is the tail node of e, and M 1 was the first node to be set to this label. Otherwise, r N K M 1 ,e,m,i is 0. Then, we clearly have
is a binary variable taking the value one if and only if pγpeq ' mqr1 . . . rs " Y i and there exists some M 1 ď e such that λpM 1 q " λpM q. Therefore, once again by linearity, it is enough to compute Er r N K e,m,i s " Pr " r N K e,m,i " 1 ı for all e. Note that if this is the case, this means that there exists some message M i (whose corresponding node was traversed before getting to e and M ), such that λpM q collides with one of the internal values in the computation of CBCpM i q, or in other words (using the language of [5] ), this would imply a full collision in computing CBCpM q and CBCpM i q: Formally, a full collision means that CBCpM q collides with one of the other state values generated in the computation of CBCpM i q and CBCpM q, also cf. Appendix C above for a definition, and the associated full collision probability FCP n pM i , M q. Therefore,
Note that [5] only gives bounds for FCP n pM i , M q when M i is not a prefix of M , but the bound trivially extends, since if M i is a prefix of M , then a full collision implies a full collision for M and any other non-prefix message M 1 . Thus, to conclude, we observe that
where we have used the fact that
This concludes the proof of Lemma 8.
Remark. In the above proof, one would expect that Er r N K e,m,i s is much smaller (perhaps even by a multiplicative factor 2 r ). In fact, we are essentially assuming that as soon as collision occur, then this collision implies r N K e,m,i " 1. While this may not always be the case, it is very hard to argue about the distribution of CBCpM q conditioned on the computation CBCpM i q and CBCpM q provoking a full collision. In particular, one can build examples showing that it is not uniform, and in general, very badly understood.
E Tightness of bound for GSponge -Missing Analysis
For the analysis, in the real world we consider the event COLL that for some i P rQ 1 s and i 1 P rQ 2 s we have πpK 1 ' M i qrr`1 . . . ns " B i 1 ,0 rr`1 . . . ns and observe that PrrCOLLs ě ΩpQ 1 Q 2 {2 n´r q (assuming Q 1 ! 2 n´r ). Again, if COLL occurs due to some indices i and i 1 then by construction Y i,j " B i 1 ,j for all j P rts and A outputs 1. Therefore,
However, if O " R for a truly random function R : t0, 1u˚Ñ t0, 1u r , all values Y i,j 's are independent random r-bit strings, since the messages M i are distinct. Hence, by union bound, suitable i and i 1 exist with probability at most
F Proof of Theorem 2 (sketch)
In this Appendix, we discuss the changes that are necessary to adapt the proof approach we used to analyze truncated CBC to the setting of sponges-based MACs.
The transcripts. First, since the adversary is now allowed to query π, we will also include its π-queries and the respective answers in the transcript. Hence, if pA i , B i q for i P t1, . . . , q π u represents the π-queries asked by A and the respective responses (i.e., for each i we have πpA i q " B i and A either asked a forward π-query A i or a backward π-query B i ) then the transcript in both the real and ideal world will also contain the list pA 1 , B 1 q, . . . , pA qπ , B qπ q. Moreover, we also modify the definitions of the full and reduced message tree. The full message tree changes in one aspect: the label of the root vertex λpεq will be set to the key K " K 1 instead of the initialization vector IV, while the rest of the tree labeling is computed from this root label identically as in the proof of Theorem 1 and the same process is applied to obtain its reduced version. Since the full and reduced message trees now depend on K, we will denote them as T π,K pM 1 , . . . , M q C q and T π,K pM 1 , . . . , M q C q, respectively. Finally, we add one additional bit into the transcript, carrying the information whether an overlap has occurred between the π-queries asked directly by the adversary, and the π-queries that were needed to compute the labelling of the (full) message tree. Formally, we define PiHit as pPiHit " 1q :ô pDM P V : λpM q P tB 1 , . . . , B qπ uq , where λ denotes the non-reduced labelling function. Since the bit PiHit is determined by giving a labelled message tree T and a list of π-queries tpA i , B i qu qπ i"1 , we sometimes use the notation PiHitpT, tpA i , B i qu qπ i"1 q to give these explicitly. Hence, both the real and the ideal transcript will have the form
where the pairs pM i , Y i q represent the adversary's construction queries, just like before. The realworld (resp. ideal-world) experiment generating the real-world transcript T real (resp. the ideal-world transcript T ideal ) is defined as follows:
Real world. The transcript T real for the adversary A is obtained by sampling π uniformly at random from the set of permutations on t0, 1u n and a uniform key K Ð t0, 1u n , and letting
where we execute A, which adaptively asks construction queries M 1 , . . . , M q C answered with Y i " GSpongerπs K pM i q for all i P rq C s, and q π π-queries that result in input-output pairs pA 1 , B 1 q, . . . , pA qπ , B qπ q, and then we compute T " T π,K pM 1 , . . . , Mand use its non-reduced version T π,K pM 1 , . . . , Mand tpA i , B i qu qπ i"1 to determine PiHit. This time T real only depends on π and K, hence we sometimes write T real pπ, Kq for the corresponding map. Ideal world. The transcript T ideal for the adversary A is obtained similarly to the above, but here we sample both a random permutation π and q C independent random values Y 1 , . . . , Y q C P t0, 1u r and we let
where we execute A, which adaptively asks construction queries M 1 , . . . , M q answered with Y i for all i P rqs, and q π π-queries that result in input-output pairs pA 1 , B 1 q, . . . , pA qπ , B qπ q, and then we compute T " T π,K pM 1 , . . . , Mfor some independent, randomly chosen K; and use its non-reduced version T π,K pM 1 , . . . , Mand tpA i , B i qu qπ i"1 to determine PiHit.
The proof again proceeds using the H-coefficient method (cf. Lemma 1), hence we need to define good and bad transcripts. A transcript (14) is good if it fulfills the requirements (1) -(3) from Definition 2 (with the natural substitution of q C instead of q) and also the following additional requirement:
(4) We have PiHit " 0.
We again denote the sets of good and bad transcripts by GT and BT respectively, this time we have BT " Ť 4 i"1 BT i . Bounding bad transcripts. We have:
The probability PrrPiHit " 1s can be bounded easily.
Lemma 9. In the ideal world we have PrrPiHit " 1s ď q π q C {2 n .
Proof. For each M P V and i P t1, . . . , q π u let PiHit M,i denote the event that λpM q " B i for the non-reduced labelling λ. By definition of GSpongerπs K we know that there exists a permutation ρ independent of K such that λpM q " ρpKq, namely ρ corresponds to the evaluation of the sponge on a fixed input M , from the initial state K. Since the key K is chosen uniformly at random and independently of the view of the adversary, the value λpM q will also be uniformly random and independent of the adversarial π-queries. Hence PrrPiHit M,i s " 2´n and by union bound over all pM, iq we have PrrPiHit " 1s ď q π q C {2 n .
[ \ Next we need to upper-bound the probabilities PrrT ideal P BT i | PiHit " 0s for i P t1, . . . , 3u.
Lemma 10. We have:
3. For any parameter t ě 1 defining BT 3 ,
Proof (sketch). The bounds can be established from Lemmas 3-5 in a generic way. Namely, since we are conditioning on PiHit " 0 we know that there will be no overlap between the π-queries asked by the adversary and those that are needed to label the full message tree T . Second, to get closer to the TCBC setting, we consider the key K to be fixed and only average over its choice in the end. This means that the argument can follow the same path as in the case with the all-zero initial state and no adversarial π-queries, with a small difference: now, whenever π is lazy-sampled at a fresh point, instead of returning a uniform element from the set of all 2 n´i unused values, it will instead sample from the smaller set of 2 n´q π´i values, since the query-answer pairs asked by the adversary also have to be avoided to maintain PiHit " 0. The statistical distance between the old and new distribution at every such sampling is hence upper-bounded by
assuming q C ď 2 n´1 as otherwise the bounds are trivial. As π is always invoked at most q C times during the labeling of T , the probability of a bad transcript ocurring in our setting differs from the probability of its ocurrence in the settings considered in Lemmas 3-5 by at most 2 q C q π {2 n .
[ \ Lower-bounding the probability ratio. It now remains to bound the ratio Pr rT real " τ s {Pr rT ideal " τ s for all good transcripts τ . Towards this, we proceed as in Section 4.4, describing the necessary modifications along the way. We start by observing that since the padding function padp¨q only outputs non-empty strings, we have M i ‰ ε for all i P rq C s. Hence, by the construction of the reduced message tree T , we have λpεq ‰ K and therefore λpεq " K for every good transcript. Each good transcript τ hence determines the key K and we will sometimes refer to this key by writing Kpτ q. Now, similarly as before we can define
Ωrτ s " tπ : T real pπ, Kpτ" τ u
and
where T pτ q denotes the reduced message tree given in the transcript τ . Intuitively, Ω 1 contains all permutations π that are consistent with the transcript τ on all its parts except possibly the outputs Y 1 , . . . , Y q C (note that we have PiHit " 0 in τ since τ P GT). We again denote by ppτ q the ratio
remains satisfied since this time we have
where the first two factors in the latter equation capture the (independent, uniformly random) choice of the key K and the outputs Y i , respectively.
To lower-bound ppτ q, we will again use the fact that
and consider the same process for setting labels λpM i q, γpM i , M i } mq and extending the partial permutation π as in the proof of Theorem 1. We also consider the set L of all tuples pz 1 , . . . , z q C q of q C distinct values such that:
-z i r1..rs " Y i for all i P rq C s, -when assigning λpM i q Ð z i for all i P rqs in the above process, at the end of the process all the labels λpM i q " z i are unique within the set of all vertex labels; for all i P rqs and all m P M i the labels λpM i } mq are unique in the same sense; and PiHit " 0.
The lower bound on ppτ q is then obtained by giving a lower bound on:
-the probability that any particular tuple from L appears as the labels for vertices pM 1 , . . . , M q C q when π is chosen at random from Ω 1 rτ s; and -the size of the set L.
For the former, one can again for any pz 1 , . . . , z q C q P L establish the bound
using an analogous argument as in the case considered for Theorem 1. Namely, we again have
ı " |tπ P Ω 1 rτ s : @i P rq C s : πpx i q " z i u| |Ω 1 rτ s| and it remains to bound the numbers of permutations in the sets in both the numerator and the denominator. Here we additionally (in contrast to the proof of Theorem 1) have to take into account that the permutations we are counting are always defined on additional q π points to comply with the π-queries listed in τ . However, this affects both counts equally and hence cancels out.
To lower-bound |L|, we will again be choosing the values z i one by one and for every i give a lower bound on the number of admissible values z i . Namely, we will exclude a candidate value for z i if it satisfies any of the properties (1)- (5) given on page 15 or the additional properties (6)- (7) defined as follows: (6) There exists an adversarial π-query pA j , B j q such that z i " B j . (7) There exists an adversarial π-query pA j , B j q and an m P M i such that z i ' m " A j .
The numbers of excluded values due to conditions (1)-(5) are estimated in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1, while for conditions (6)- (7) we need to exclude additional at most q π and D i q π values, respectively. Redoing the computation (8), we arrive at
Putting pieces together. The above gives us
and by plugging this into Lemma 1 together with the results of Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, we obtain
p q C q t`1 2 nt for any parameter t ě 1.
G Proof of Theorem 3
In Theorem 2 we proved the PRF security of the GSponge construction, here we will explain how to extend the proof to the case where the key K 1 is not uniform, but generated from w short b-bit keys Kr1s, . . . , Krws as illustrated in Figure 3 , i.e, set V 0 :" 0 n then compute V i " πppKris } 0 n´b q ' V i´1 q for i " 1, . . . , w and set
For this we define the transcript T 1 real for Sponge in almost the same way as we defined the transcript T real for GSponge (cf eq.(15) and the paragraphs above and below it), but where instead of sampling a random n-bit string K and then setting Y i " GSpongerπs K pM i q, we now sample a key K " pKr1s, . . . , Krwsq that consists of a w-tuple of random b-bit strings, and compute K 1 from K and π as in (16) . Note that we do not include the inputs/outputs of the w extra invocation of π required to compute K 1 into the transcript T 1 real , so the transcripts for Sponge and GSponge are defined over the same domain. By the lemma below, these transcripts are also statistically close:
Lemma 11. The statistical distance of the real transcript T real for GSponge as defined in (15) and T 1 real for Sponge as defined above is (below q " q π` q C denotes an upper bound on the total number of invocations of π in the attack on Sponge)
If w " 1, one can remove the q 2 {2 n´b term above. Assuming q ď 2 n´b we can remove this term at the cost of increasing the first
Before we prove this lemma, we observe that together with Theorem 2, this implies Theorem 3. We have Adv prf Sponge r,pad b
,π pAq ď SDpT 1 real , T ideal q ď SDpT 1 real , T real q`SDpT real , T ideal q and we can bound the last two terms with the bounds from Lemma 11 and Theorem 2, respectively. Note that we didn't state the q ď 2 n´b condition from Lemma 11 in the theorem because if this condition is not satisfied, the theorem is void anyway.
Proof (of Lemma 11).
Below we define a way of sampling a joint distribution pT, auxq. There are two distinguished values K 1 , K 2 in the support of aux, and we will sometimes write aux " K for aux P tK 1 , K 2 u. The distribution pT, auxq will satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) SDpT, T real q " 0, so the marginal distribution T is the same as real GSponge transcripts. (2) For any τ˚we have Prrpτ, αq Ð pT, auxq : pτ " τ˚q^paux ‰ Kqs ď PrrT
(3) The probability that the auxiliary information is K is at most Prrpτ, αq Ð pT, auxq : aux " Ks ď q 2 {2 n´b`q {2 bw`w q{2 n ,
or alternatively
Prrpτ, αq Ð pT, auxq : aux " Ks ď q{2 b´logp3nq´1 2 w`w q{2 n .
Note that the three points above imply the Lemma with
real q ď Prrpτ, αq Ð pT, auxq : aux " Ks where the last equality above follows as for any random variables X, Y and any event E we have that if for all v in the domain PrrX " v^Es ď PrrY " vs then SDpX, Y q ď Prr Es.
Sampling pT, auxq. The augmented transcript distribution pT, auxq is defined as follows. We first sample a transcript T real and set T " T real (note that this already implies condition (1) above).
We now define how to sample the second part aux of the distribution. Note that to sample T " T real , we have sampled a uniformly random key K 1 P t0, 1u n and a random permutation π. It will be convenient to think of π being "lazy" sampled, so at this point we only have a partially defined permutationπ that is defined on at most q π` q C inputs.
We now sample a key K " Kr1s, . . . , Krws consisting of w random b-bit blocks. Next, we check if the partially defined π allows to compute the key: Starting with V 0 :" 0 n , compute V i " πppKris } 0 n´b q ' V i´1 q for all i " 1, 2, . . . until either i " w or we get an input on which π is not yet defined. If i " w, i.e., we have computed the key, we set aux " K 1 (the reason is that now almost certainly V w ‰ K 1 , and thus we we have a transcript which we cannot make look as if it was generated by Sponge). Proving Condition (2) . Intuitively, if in the process just described we stopped at i ă w, then the next V i will be the output of π on a "fresh" input, and thus close to uniform. At this point, we define the V i`1 , . . . , V w´1 uniformly at random and set V w " K 1 . If any of the V i`1 , . . . , V w is not "fresh" in the sense that it appears anywhere else in the transcript, we set aux " K 2 . Otherwise, we set aux to contain the input/output pairs of the w queries to π made while computing K 1 (note that this implicitly also defines the key K " Kr1s, . . . , Krws).
To prove condition (2) we now also augment the transcripts of GSponge to get a distribution pT 1 real , aux 1 q, where aux 1 contains the w queries made to π while computing K 1 . To prove (2) we'll show that for any transcript pτ˚, α˚q in the support of pT 1 real , aux 1 q we have Prrpτ, αq Ð pT, auxq : pτ˚, α˚q " pτ, αqs ď Prrpτ, αq Ð pT
With this, (17) follows by taking the sum over all α˚on both sides of the above equation.
Note that we only must consider transcripts pτ˚, α˚q where during the computation of K 1 from K we made a "fresh" query (otherwise aux " K, but aux 1 is never K, so it's not in the support of pT 1 real , aux 1 q). Consider any such fixed transcript pτ˚, α˚q, and assume we sample pT 1 real , aux 1 q or pT, auxq such that we immediately abort as soon as we're inconsistent with pτ˚, α˚q, and we sample the "fresh" outputs V i`1 , . . . , V w´1 at the very end. Here, the sampling of pT 1 real , aux 1 q and pT, auxq is identical (and thus has the same probability of being consistent with pτ˚, α˚q) up to the point where we must sample the V i`1 , . . . , V w´1 . In pT, auxq these are sampled uniformly at random, whereas when sampling pT 1 real , aux 1 q, this values are implicitly defined as we sample the outputs of π on the fresh inputs V j " πppKrjs}0 n´b q ' V j´1 for j " i`1, . . . , w´1. The probability of sampling consistently in the latter case is at least as high as sampling the V j 's uniformly, as now the sampling space is smaller (because π is already defined on some outputs, and these can now be excluded), this proves condition (2) . Proving Condition (3). It remains to upper bound the probability that aux P tK 1 , K 2 u to prove condition (3). For K 2 we get the following simple claim Claim. Let q " q π` q C be an upper bound on the total number of invocations of π. Then
Proof. The probability that any particular of the uniformly sampled V i 's "hits" any of the at most q values on which π is already defined is q{2 n . As we sample at most w of them, we get the claimed bound by the union bound.
[ \ The bound on the probability of aux " K 1 is a bit more tedious, and we outsourced it to Lemma 12 below. Note that the above claim with Lemma 12 prove condition (3).
[ \ Lemma 12. Let q " q π` q C , then
if w " 1 (i.e., the key is just one b-bit block) then we can ignore the q 2 2 n´b term above. If q ď 2 n´b we can ignore this term, at the prize of increasing the 2nd
Proof (of Lemma 12) . Consider the sampling of pT, auxq right after we sampled the key K " pKr1s, . . . , Krwsq. We will say that K is fixed if we can compute K 1 " V w without having to define π on new points (i.e., with V 0 :" 0 n , we can compute V i " πppKris } 0 n´b q ' V i´1 q for i " 1, . . . , w). Let #K denote the number of fixed keys, note that with this we can express the probability of aux " K 1 as
So it remains to bound #K. Below, we will first define an event γ 0 (think of γ 0 as a boolean variable where γ 0 " 0 which means the condition holds, and γ 0 " 1 means it failed), where conditioned on γ 0 holding, the number of fixed keys #K can be upper bounded with q. We'll show that γ 0 fails with probability at most q 2 {2 n´b , which then gives us the bound in (19) . Unfortunately, the q 2 {2 n´b term is quite large, in particular, it would dominate our bounds for Sponge. To get rid of this term, we generalise the event γ 0 to γ m for any m P N. For γ 3n´1 we can show that it fails with only extremely small probability ă 2´n, and conditioned on γ 3n´1 we can still upper bound the number of fixed keys #K with qn w (as opposed to q under γ 0 ). This will then give us the bound (20) .
The event γ 0 . The event γ 0 fails if during the experiment (during which we made at most q invocations to π) we made a forward or backward query, where the output collided with some previous value on the last n´b bits. Concretely, γ 0 " 1 if at some point we made either a fresh forward query X and got the output Y Ð πpXq where π was already defined on some pX 1 , Y 1 q satisfying Y rb`1 . . . ns " Y 1 rb`1 . . . ns, or an inverse query Y and got the output X Ð π´1pY q where some pX 1 , Y 1 q satisfies Xrb`1 . . . ns " X 1 rb`1 . . . ns. The probability of γ 0 failing can be bounded by a standard birthday bound
Moreover, we claim that
We postpone the proof of (22) , and note that now using that
Prraux " K 1 s " Prraux " K 1^γm " 1s`Prraux " K 1^γm " 0s ď Prrγ m " 1s`Prraux " K 1 | γ m " 0s (23) implies the first bound (19) in the statement of the claim.
The event γ m . For m P N`, the event γ m fails if we made m`1 or more forward queries (or m`1 backward queries) that collide on the last n´b bits. More precisely, γ m " 1 if during the experiment the permutation π was invoked on m`1 forward queries X 0 . . . X m which resulted in answers Y i Ð πpX i q that all had the same last n´b bits, similarly for backward queries. We claim the following:
Claim.
Prrγ 3n´1 " 1s ď 2´n .
Proof (of Claim). This follows by a Chernoff bound: Assume we made a forward query Y 0 Ð πpX 0 q (backwards queries are proven similarly) to π. Subsequently, we make at most q other forward queries, and for any of those queries, the probability that their output collides with Y 0 on the last n´b bits is 1{2 n´b . 14 The expected number of such collisions µ is thus ď q{2 n´b ď 1 (as we assume q ď 2 n´b ). Using Theorem 4 with δ " 3n´1 and µ ď 1,
Prr# of collisions ě 3ns ď e´p 3n´1q 2 {p3n`1q ď 2´2 n .
The above bounds the probability of a particular query being "hit" by 3n´1 or more subsequent queries. Taking the union bound over all q ď 2 n´b ă 2 n such queries proves (24) as 2´2 n 2 n " 2´n.
[ \ It remains to prove that conditioned on γ 3n´1 " 0, the number of fixed keys can be bounded as
Before proving this, note that plugging in the bounds (25) and (24) to (23) implies statement (20) of the claim.
Bounding #T assuming γ m " 0. It remains to prove (22) and (25) . For this we build a tree from the partially defined π which will capture the possible computations of K 1 from K " pKr1s, . . . , Krwsq as follows:
-The root of the tree is v and we assign the label 0 n to it (we will write v 1 to denote the label of v and e 1 to denote the label of an edge e). -For every k 1 P t0, 1u b on which πppk 1 }0 n´b q ' vq is defined, we add a node v k 1 with label v 1 k 1 " πppk 1 }0 n´b q ' vq and a directed edge e k 1 " pv, v k 1 q with label e 1 k 1 " pk 1 }0 n´b ' vq. -We continue to build this tree level by level. Assume we build level i ă w (the root is level 0, and we just described how to build the nodes on level 1). The nodes on level i are named v k 1 ,...,k i (each k j P t0, 1u b ), consider any such node. If there exists k i`1 P t0, 1u b s.t. πppk i`1 }0 n´b q ' v 1 k 1 ,...,k i q is defined, then add a node v k 1 ,...,k i ,k i`1 with label πppk i`1 }0 n´b q ' v 1 k 1 ,...,k i`1 q and connect v k 1 ,...,k i and v k 1 ,...,k i`1 with an edge e k 1 ,...,k i`1 with label pk i`1 }0 n´b q ' v 1 k 1 ,...,k i`1 .
Note that the computation of a key K 1 from a fixed key pKr1s, . . . , Krwsq corresponds to a path from the root to the node v Kr1s,...,Krws , and the label of this node is K 1 . So, every leave of this tree at the last level w correspond to a fixed key.
The collapsed Tree Graph G π . Consider the tree we just defined, then we denote with G π the (directed, loop-free) graph we get when merging all nodes with the same label in the same layer of the tree.
The γ 0 Case. To prove (22) , we will show that #K ď q if γ 0 " 0. This follows from the following two claims:
Claim. If G π is a tree (i.e., we haven't collapsed any labels), then there are at most q fixed keys.
Proof (of Claim). In G π every node at level w (recall that there are at most q nodes in total) corresponds to exactly one fixed key, as in a tree there can be only one path from any node to the root.
[ \ Claim. If γ 0 " 0 then G π is a tree.
Proof (of Claim). It will be convenient to assume that the very first query made by the adversary was a forward query 0 n to π. Assume G π is not a tree, we must show that then γ 0 " 1. As G π is not a tree, there is at least one vertex v˚with in-degree two. Let v 0 and v 1 be the two nodes that point to v˚, then v 1 0 rb`1 . . . ns " v 1 1 rb`1 . . . ns. 15 If both outputs v 1 0 , v 1 1 resulted originally from forward queries to π then by definition γ 0 " 1 and we're done. So, assume that at least one of them, say v 1 0 , resulted from an inverse query. Let v 2 be a parent of v 0 and e 0 the edge v 2 Ñ v 0 . Note that e 1 0 Ð π´1pv 1 0 q is the label of e 0 , and that v 1 2 rb`1 . . . ns " e 1 0 rb`1 . . . ns (as the label of a vertex and any edge leaving it are always identical on the last n´b bits). We consider 3 possible cases:
-If v 2 is the root, then we made an inverse query whose output ended with 0 n´b , and thus we have a collision with the very first forward query and thus γ 0 " 1 (recall that we assumed the first query is the forward query 0 n ). -If v 1 2 was the output of a forward query, then this forward query collides on the last n´b bits with the inverse query on input v 1 0 (as explained above) and thus γ 0 " 1. -If v 2 is the output of an inverse query, we repeat the above argument with v 2 taking the role of v 0 .
In the first two cases above we have γ 0 " 1, in the last case we walked down one layer in in G π , and we can do this at most w times before hitting the root (and thus land in the first case), so ultimately γ 0 " 1 will hold.
[ \ The γ m Case. We just bounded #K assuming γ 0 , we will now show a bound for #K assuming only the weaker condition γ m for some m ą 0 holds. Recall that with any fixed key pKr1s, . . . , Krwsq we can associate a path of length w from the root v to v Kr1s,...,Krws in G π , and each edge in G π corresponds to a query (either a forward or a backward query) that was made to π. We define the signature s P t0, 1u w of K as follows: For j P t1 . . . nu, srjs " 0 if the query corresponding to the j-th edge on the path was a forward query, and srjs " 1 otherwise.
With G s π we denote the subgraph of G π where we delete every edge e at level i if this edge corresponds to a forward query but sris " 1 or to a backward query but sris " 0. Note that any path corresponding to a fixed key K with signature s in G π is also contained in G s π . Thus, to upper bound #K it suffices to upper bound the number of paths in each G s π separately, which we do in the following claim. 15 This holds as for some x, y P t0, 1u b we have v Claim. If γ m " 0, then for any signature s, any node u (with label u 1 ) at level w in G s π , the number of paths from the root to u (or equivalently, the number of fixed keys with signature s that result in a key V w " u 1 using the rule (16) Proof (of Claim). We will assume that m ă 2 b as otherwise the claim is trivial (as the bound is larger than the total number of paths in G π which is at most 2 bw ).
As a warm-up, consider the case where the signature is s " 0 w , i.e., all forward queries. As γ m " 0, we never had a m`1-wise collision in forward queries, which implies that the in-degree of any node in G s π is at most m. So, the single node u at level w is connected to at most m nodes at level w´1, each node in level w´1 is connected to at most m nodes at level w´2, etc. With every level the number of paths increases by a factor m, and thus when we reach the root (at level 0) we have at most m w ď 2 bw 2 m w 2 paths. Let |s| denote the Hamming weight (i.e., the number of 1's) of s. Now consider any s where |s| ď w{2. We can make the above argument, that going from level i down to i´1 increases the number of paths by a factor at most m for any level i where sris " 0. For the remaining |s| steps we can't say anything, except the trivial fact that the outdegree of any node is bounded by 2 b , and thus going from level i down to level i´1 increases the number of paths by a factor at most 2 b even if sris " 1. The total number of paths is thus at most where we used that |s| ď w{2 and m ď 2 b . For the remaining cases where |s| ą w{2, can do a similar argument, but now we upper bound the number of paths in the other direction, starting at the root going towards u. By definition, γ m " 0 implies that for any i P rns with sris " 1, the nodes in G s π at level i´1 have out-degree at most m (as otherwise we had at least m`1 collisions on inverse queries, and thus γ m " 1). By a counting argument as before, the number of paths from the root to u can be now upper bounded by 2 bpw´|s|q m |s| ď 2 where we used that |s| ą w{2 and m ď 2 b .
[ \ As there are at most q nodes in G π (and thus also in G s π for any s), and 2 w possible signatures, using the above claim we get for m " 3n´1 This proves (25) .
